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Date Published: Mar 16, 2010 - 11:41 am
Last week, Dahlia Lithwick had a terrific piece in Slate in which
she ponders America's
"Terrorism Derangement Syndrome." America does seem
to be in the grip of morbid fear, doesn't it? KSM could irradiate
Manhattan if he's given a trial there... terrorists can melt the
walls of supermax prisons... the Underwear Bomber is so
diabolically clever he would laugh off traditional interrogation
methods. With all this terror, you might even think... I don't
know, that terrorism is working pretty well.
Lithwick attributes some of the cause of TDS to Republican
fear-mongering and to Democratic acquiescence in GOP scare tactics.
I agree -- but I think there's something more fundamental going on,
something that explains both the fear and the fear-mongering.
Something like... our own policies.
I believe some deep-seated part of our national consciousness is
aware there will be consequences for what we've done, and continue
to do. The
wars, and
kidnappings, and illegal imprisonment, and
off-the-mark Predator strikes, and,
most of all,
torture -- we sense a reckoning for all this, a
conflagration waiting to engulf the combustible materials we insist
on piling recklessly, relentlessly higher. Our tactics worsen the
danger. The worse the danger, the more scared we get. The more
scared we get, the less capable we are of rational policies. As our
rationality deserts us, we embrace more tightly primitive tactics.
And the more primitive we become,
the worse we make the danger. And so on.
So yes, we're afraid. After all, we understand revenge, don't we?
Revenge is a human need so powerful that, if necessary, we'll
attempt to satisfy it
by proxy, the way we satisfied our need for 9/11
vengeance against al Qaeda by
attacking Iraq, instead. We know payback is coming
because by God, if there were a country kidnapping Americans and
imprisoning them and torturing them in secret prisons, and if that
country constantly threatened to bomb us and sometimes actually did
so, and if the bombs often missed and massacred women and children
and funerals and wedding parties, we would not -- we
could not -- rest until that country
came to rue the day it even considered fucking with the United
States of America.
That's how it would be if the shoe were on the other foot -- in
fact, that's how it was. And you don't have to be psychic, or even
exceptionally empathetic, to know that's how it is with other
cultures, too. A little imagination and intuition are more than
enough.
Imagination and intuition, as it happens, is the same combination
that makes us sure Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Our own
National Intelligence Estimate claims otherwise,
but we don't believe the NIE because what would we do if we were
subject to the kind of
bellicose rhetoric our politicians and press
level at Iran? What would we do if we were Iran, and America had
invaded our neighbors east and west? We wouldn't rest until we had
nukes, so we know Iran is after them, just as we would be. Anyone
who suggests otherwise must be wrong.
As I wrote
over a year ago:
It's common for rightists to justify America's embrace of the
"dark side" by claiming President Bush has kept the country safe.
The claim strikes me as remarkably simplistic. If the temporal
frame of reference begins on 9/11, and we ignore the unsolved
anthrax attacks that came shortly after, and the geographical
frame of reference is the territorial United States alone, then
one might accurately claim America has been safe up until now. Whether the correlation
between "the dark side" and our safety up until this point has a
causal connection is far more debatable. Regardless, to me, "has
kept us safe up until this point" has far too much the ring of
Neville Chamberlain's "peace in our time." It also makes me think
of a parent who seems to be an excellent provider because he's
financing all those provisions on a dozen maxed-out credit cards.
The temporary comfort he's afforded his family will inevitably be
wiped out by the unpayable bill they're all soon to receive.
Watching these documentaries, you can't help but feel that bill
is out there, and that soon enough, it will be horrifically
presented to us. Even if you believe "the dark side" offers
benefits, and you're willing to ignore what the dark side has
cost us in terms of our own ideals and our image in the world,
that bill, when it comes, will represent the dark side's true
price.
What every American needs to understand about torture and the rest
of the "dark side" is this. Not only has our embrace of the dark
side violated our laws and profaned our values. And not only have
we received no safety in exchange for our willingness to cash in
our national ideals. No, the real irony, the real tragedy is that
war and secret prisons and torture and the rest have created and
continue to create a new generation of Muslim extremists intent on
revenge. We know this. We try to stopper our minds, but our
intuition won't be silenced. It's why we're so afraid.
P.S. You can also find this piece cross-posted at
Truthout, where there are already some interesting
comments.
Date Published: Feb 13, 2010 - 11:26 am
There are various factors behind America's
growing embrace of torture, but among them,
largely overlooked, is a brilliant campaign of cross-promotion
between right-wing ideologues and right-wing entertainment.
First, the right reduced the entirety of torture to a simple
talking point: "Can you really say torture never works?" And then
answered the question through thriller novels and television
shows.
There's a reason Glenn Beck so assiduously hawks what he calls the
"conservative porn" of novelist Vince Flynn.
When Flynn's series character, covert operator Mitch Rapp, saves
the day through torture, his deeds vindicate the authoritarian
worldview Beck advocates. Beck even has a list of
his top ten thrillers at Borders, with Flynn and
another rightist thriller writer, Brad Thor, in the top two slots.
Nor is Beck alone: he is joined in his promotion of pro-torture
novels by
Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Hugh Hewitt. And of
course
the right loves no one so much as Jack Bauer,
the "24" operative whose defense of America always depends on
torture -- a love
the show returns in kind.
All of which raises an important question: why? Given that expert
interrogators like the Air Force's
Matthew Alexander and
Steven Kleinman and the FBI's
Ali Soufan and
Jack Cloonan agree not only that torture is
unnecessary, but that, by producing false leads and creating new
jihadists, it has
made America less safe; given the existence of
scientific evidence demonstrating why and how
torture produces false information; and given that there is
no reliable evidence that America's resort to
torture
foiled any jihadist plots, we have to ask, why
does the right continue to promote it?
Because fictional questions about torture's efficacy obscure real
questions about its criminality. The
UN
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment, signed by Ronald Reagan and ratified by the Senate,
not only prohibits torture, but categorically rules out all
exceptions. By Article VI of the Constitution, the UNCAT is the
supreme Law of the Land (because the treaty also
requires party nations to investigate and prosecute credible
allegations of torture, President Obama is himself now in
violation).
It's surprising the left has been so feckless in its response.
True, the left is no marketing juggernaut. After all, this is the
movement that chose the stunningly vague and uninspiring product
name "the public option" for its make-or-break health care rollout.
But because the best thrillers are the most realistic, the form is
ideally suited to dramatically examine the actual motivations
behind torture (
panic,
incompetence,
proxy revenge). Or to make plain the real fruits of
torture (
new jihadist recruits and
increasingly radicalized Muslims). Or to show how
torture, once permitted in military and intelligence circles,
metastasizes to civilian law enforcement and
otherwise. Or to detail the way torture
brutalizes our society and
destroys the
psyches of the young men and women we encourage to do it in our
names. And yet some of the most commercially successful thrillers
are those whose take on torture is the most cartoonish.
If the leftwing mass media continues to ignore political thrillers,
this important means of shaping the public debate on torture and
other critical issues will remain the exclusive weapon of the Glenn
Becks of the world. Worse, as reviewers like Kirkus go under and
newspapers and magazines curtail their book coverage, writers and
publishers, aware that the best means of publicizing their
thrillers will be an appearance on Beck or Limbaugh, will shape
their stories to please the talking heads whose ministrations they
increasingly crave. There's already an orthodoxy among some
publishers that the audience for thrillers is largely conservative,
an understandable (though mistaken) conclusion caused by the fact
that the only mass media hawking thrillers today is rightwing. And
with the sad recent news about the demise of Air America, that
mistaken orthodoxy is likely set to deepen.
Those of us who value the rule of law and the blessings of liberty
in America need to wake up. Novelists, bloggers, screen and
teleplay writers, journalists, talk show hosts -- if we don't start
hanging together, then, as Benjamin Franklin said, assuredly we
shall all hang separately.
P.S. Proud to say I'm now blogging both at
Truthout and at the
Huff Post, where this piece ran today on the
front page. If you have a chance,
stop by and leave a comment (already responded
there to a bunch) -- thanks.
Date Published: Feb 11, 2010 - 10:47 pm
Don't be misled by the
self-serving narratives Amazon and Macmillan
have advanced following their recent eBooks battle. Amazon's
narrative is "We're Pro-Consumer;" Macmillan (and paper publishers
in general) counter with "We're Anti-Monopoly." Neither of these
narratives is untrue, but neither addresses the real cause of this
war.
What's happening is this. Amazon is doing everything it can to
speed the transition to eBooks because, in a digital world,
Amazon's costs of shipping and storage essentially disappear. Paper
publishers are doing everything they can to slow the transition to
eBooks because, in a digital world, paper publishers' high hardback
margins essentially disappear.
That's it. One side wants to improve its profits through lower
costs; the other, through higher margins. Everything else is
commentary, much of it misleading.
Paper publishing has been around a long time and hasn't changed
much. Think of it as a castle, surrounded by earthworks built out
of the high margins publishers enjoy on hardback books. Now imagine
digital as a surging tide comprised of two elements: (1)
increasingly low-cost, high-quality digital book readers; and (2)
lower-priced digital books. Amazon has attacked publishing's
fortifications first by introducing the Kindle, and second, by
selling eBooks at a loss. Publishers can't counter the first
strategy (and even if they could, it wouldn't matter -- Apple,
B&N, Sony, and plenty of other players are constantly improving
and lowering the costs of digital readers). They have found a way
to temporarily counter the second, by forcing Amazon to price
eBooks no lower than $15, which is what the battle with Macmillan
was fought over.
But it was only a battle. In the wider war, digital readers will
continue to get better, cheaper, and more widely adopted. As for
the price of eBooks, publishers can only control the price of the
what Amazon buys from them. If you were Amazon, therefore, and
publishers had stymied one of the two prongs of your strategy for
speeding the transition to digital, what would you do?
That's right. You'd speed your own transition to
becoming a publisher. This has been
happening anyway; all Macmillan has done is
provide Amazon with an incentive to do it faster. In the coming
months, therefore, expect to see Amazon announce that it's poached
some combination of editors and writers from major paper
publishers. It will then publish its own eBooks at whatever price
it believes will most effectively speed the transition to digital.
Drive the price of eBooks low enough, and consumers' perceptions of
the value of all books will radically change. It's this
changing perception publishers fear. Consumers
will buy a $17 hardback if the eBook costs $15. Charge $5 for that
same eBook, and $17 for a hardback becomes an impossible sell.
Earthworks are a static defense. Publishers can do a few things to
make the walls marginally higher and thicker, but that's about it.
Meanwhile, the force of the digital tide is always increasing.
Eventually, a kinetic and ever stronger offense will overwhelm a
static, finite defense. Either publishers don't know this, in which
case they're deluded; or they do know it, in which case they're
just playing for time while their employees update their resumes.
Either way, their position is grim. If they want to survive, they
can't just hunker down behind their crumbling walls. They need an
offense.
What would that offense be? The only solution I can imagine is for
the major paper publishers to stop selling digital rights to Amazon
and other retailers and establish their own well branded and
managed online store. It's probably too late for them to make such
a move anyway, but even if it weren't, the chances that a media
industry could do something so radical are
vanishingly small. And even if they did manage
to pull it off, they'd keep eBook prices high to shore up their
paper profits -- which is of course what they're doing now. Piracy
would increase, and Amazon would muscle in with its own line of
low-cost eBooks. To make it work, publishers would have to
radically lower eBook prices and cannibalize their high-margin
hardback sales. I've never heard of a company managing such a
bold move, and I don't think a publisher will be the
first to pull it off. But in a land of
zero-cost distribution, with their primary
competitive advantage further eroding every day, publishers need to
establish their own direct link to consumers. If they don't,
they'll offer no significant value in the changing ecosystem in
which they find themselves, at which point they will become
extinct.
I hope I don't sound unsympathetic. I make a good living selling
hardback books through paper publishers and I have many friends in
the industry who will suffer as it changes, so on a personal level
the transition to digital isn't something I welcome wholeheartedly.
But when analyzing a trend, it pays to set aside sentiment.
I used the word "extinct" above. It's hard to avoid the imagery the
word naturally conjures: dinosaurs, blinking in frightened
confusion as they find themselves encircled by new, hungry-looking
predators encroaching on the territory that was once exclusively
theirs. Dinosaurs had famously small brains. If publishers have an
advantage in this regard, they need to start exploiting it.
Date Published: Feb 03, 2010 - 11:27 am
I'm just about done with Tim Weiner's phenomenal
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Two
themes are at the heart of the book.
First, the Agency has been incompetent from its inception. The
roster of incompetence includes subversion operations that cost the
lives of hundreds of agents and accomplished nothing; CIA-managed
coups that backfired; the Bay of Pigs; and many others. Even
operations that "succeeded" were pyrrhic. Installing the Shah via a
CIA-sponsored coup in Iran in 1953, for example, created enmity
that resulted in the Khomeini revolution and hostage crisis of 1979
and continues to this day.
Second, the Agency and its political masters have consistently lied
to the American public about CIA domestic law breaking. Anyone
horrified at the notion that the modern CIA kidnaps and tortures
terror suspects at secret prisons should understand that these
activities
aren't aberrant, but are in fact the legacy of
programs like
Project Artichoke and
Project MKULTRA, in which the Agency built secret
prisons in Germany, Japan, and the Panama Canal Zone, prisons where
suspected double agents were tortured and dosed with heroin,
amphetamines, sleeping pills, and LSD. And, like the interrogation
videotapes the CIA now claims it destroyed in
2005, the CIA also destroyed its records of these earlier
illegal activities.
It's tempting to conclude from all this that the CIA should never
have been in the operations business -- after all, incompetence
measured against subversion of the Constitution seems a bad
bargain. But it's hard to see what CIA analysis has accomplished,
either. Mostly the analysts have been disastrously wrong (on the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the Agency continued
to insist even after Russian tanks crossed the border that it
couldn't be a full-scale invasion), but even when the Agency has
been right, it hasn't made a difference. When policy makers agree
with CIA conclusions, they use those conclusions to justify what
they were going to do anyway. When policy makers disagree with
those conclusions, they simply ignore them. Either way, the
conclusions become irrelevant. You can have the best information
and analysis in the world, but if it has no impact on policy, it's
still a waste of resources.
Counterproductive operations, activities that subverted the rule of
law, irrelevant analysis... it's hard to read Legacy of Ashes and
conclude other than that America would be better off today if the
CIA had never existed.
Of course, no politician will ever abolish the Agency. The CIA is
too useful a tool for demonstrating to the public that a politician
is doing something about a problem, and an iron law of American
politics (perhaps all politics) is that a politician can never say,
"We're doing as much as can reasonably be done about this problem,
and attacking it further would only make things worse." Also, the
CIA is too easy to ignore when ignoring it is convenient, too easy
to manipulate when CIA support is useful, and
too easy to blame when something goes wrong
(say, a mistaken and unjustified war).
So what can be done? The solution, I think, lies in a critique of
Weiner's book by Nicholoas Dujmovic,
available on the CIA's website. Dujmovic
writes:
The intelligence services that are often judged to be superior to
CIA—the Israeli Mossad, the Cuban DGI, the East German Stasi, and
even the British SIS -- are far more limited in focus and scope.
CIA from the beginning was charged with worldwide coverage in all
intelligence areas, something no other service, except perhaps
the Soviet KGB, was required to do. If making no mistakes is
Weiner’s only standard, he has adopted an unrealistic one -- a
Platonic ideal for intelligence -- that CIA, dealing with the
world as it is, could only have failed to meet.
That last line is just a straw man: Weiner doesn't require that the
CIA make no mistakes. No reasonable person would. But if Dujmovic's
point is that the CIA is too diffuse to be effective, why not focus
its mission? Eliminate its operations arm, which has consistently
done more harm than good. As for analysis, do politicians really
need secret information to formulate sensible policy toward, say,
China? And even if they did, history suggests they wouldn't use it
except to justify what they were going to do anyway. So eliminate
operations and ruthlessly focus on questions that only good
intelligence can answer: the whereabouts of Pakistani nukes, for
example, or the nature of terrorist financial networks, or how
close Iran is to acquiring nuclear weapons. Resources are always
finite, and an organization that's focused in part on China will
inevitably be less focused on Pakistan -- and will probably perform
poorly on both.
P.S. I'm proud to report that I'm now being syndicated on
Truthout, which puts
me in the company of
Mel Goodman,
Jeremy Scahill,
Andy
Worthington, and some other journalists and writers I've
learned a lot from and admire. If you have a chance, stop by and
leave a comment on
today's post -- many thanks.
Date Published: Jan 27, 2010 - 10:48 am
If you want a pristine example of why people view Democrats as
feckless wimps, here's
Obama's statement from yesterday on what the
Dems should do about health care reform following Brown's
Massachusetts victory:
"Here's one thing I know and I just want to make sure that this is
off the table. The Senate certainly shouldn't try to jam anything
through until Scott Brown is seated. People in Massachusetts spoke.
He's got to be part of that process."
Translation:
"It's not enough that the rules make it difficult to pass
legislation. We're also going to make sure we don't take full
advantage of the rules. In fact, we're going to make up nonexistent
rules, like having to delay a vote until a new guy gets seated, and
impose those nonexistent rules on ourselves. We wouldn't want
anyone to think we don't fight fair; accordingly, we're going to
tie one arm behind our back and fight that way."
Can you imagine Republicans doing this under like circumstances? Of
course not. GOP leverage of the filibuster is the very reason
Brown's election has stymied the Dems. I don't like the way the GOP
has used the filibuster (I think the rule should be eliminated
regardless of which party has a majority), and I don't think the
rule is good for the country or that it's been used in good faith,
but hey, Republicans are just exploiting the rules to what they see
as their advantage. Something Democrats are obviously themselves
afraid to do.
But neither the surface maneuvering, nor the substance of the
underlying argument, is what matters politically. What matters
politically is this: voters sense Republicans are effective;
Democrats, fearful. Republicans, unafraid of what people think of
their tactics and focused on results; Democrats, obsessed with
being liked. The comparison is not flattering to Democrats.
I just finished reading
Rory
Miller's new book on violence, tentatively entitled "Seven"
(I'm writing the foreword). Rory talks about how criminals don't
see their victims as humans, but rather as resources, and how
difficult it is for a normal person to understand this criminal
perspective. We're deeply invested in believing in our common
humanity, in the power of reason and the presence of empathy... and
it's hard for us to accept that, with certain people, we can
negotiate as effectively as we could with a hyena.
The Democrats are in a similar state. Despite
all evidence to the contrary, they remain in
denial -- still clinging to the belief that with enough compromise,
enough compassion, they can placate their Republican enemies and
negotiate the passage of some sort of compromise. They don't
understand that Republicans don't want something passed. They don't
want anything passed. They want to "
break" Obama and the Democrats and inherit the
ruins after.
Yes, a political strategy aimed primarily at breaking a party
rather than at building the country is irresponsible,
reprehensible, disgraceful, etc. But until Democrats start acting
like they understand
the nature
of the fight they're in, voters will continue to look at them
and wonder, with reason, "Jeez, if they can't handle a bunch of
bully politicians, how can they handle Ahmadinejad (or any other
officially designated boogeyman)? What will they do, complain to
Ahmadinejad that he's not being fair?"
It's one thing to show your belly if there's a reasonable chance
submission will result in mercy. But when submission repeatedly
results in your opponent attempting to disembowel you, you might
want to consider another strategy.
Unless, of course, you just really like submitting. With the
Democrats, you have to wonder.
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Indeed. One party is harmful and knows exactly what it's doing; the
other is innocuous and doesn't have a clue. One party's inept; the
other, insane. Welcome to America.
Date Published: Jan 21, 2010 - 12:18 pm
The Democrats are so pathetic.
Their latest plea is that if Martha Coakley doesn't win in
Massachusetts today, they'll lose their critical 60-seat Senate
block and with it, health care reform.
It's bullshit. If the Democrats wanted to pass health care reform,
or anything else, they could do it today. Any time they wanted,
with a simple majority vote, they could end the filibuster rule
that enables Republicans to block legislation.
This is so simple, it's useful to break it down the way a child
might approach it.
Democratic Senator: Sorry,
little girl, we can't pass health care reform without 60
votes.
Child: In school they
taught us there only 100 Senators. So don't you need only 50
votes?
Dem: Yes, but there's a
Senate rule that allows the minority party to do something called
a "filibuster," and when they do, the majority party needs 60
votes to overcome it. Filibusters used to be rare, but now the
Republicans do one for every bill we try to pass. Those
meanies.
Child: Well, where did the
rule come from?
Dem: The Senate passed
it.
Child: By a majority vote?
I mean, 50 Senators?
Dem: Yes.
Child: Then don't you need
only 50 Senators to repeal it?
Dem: Huh?
Child: I mean, if you
think Republicans are meanies who aren't being fair about the
rule, why don't you just change the rule?
Dem: That would make the
Republicans really mad!
Child: So you're afraid of
them?
Dem: Of course not!
Child: Then why don't you
change the rule?
[Silence]
Child: I was afraid of
bullies, too. But then I stood up to one and he backed down. You
should try it.
The only thing my hypothetical child might be missing -- and only
because she's so innocent -- is that the Democrats might actually
like the filibuster they're
always complaining about.
Here's a link that nicely lays out how the
filibuster works and why the Democrats are motivated to keep it:
essentially, because they can use it to excuse their failure to
fulfill their promises to their constituents while simultaneously
invoking mean Republican abuse of the rule in their fundraising
efforts.
So are the Democrats cowards or cynics? I'm not sure. Sometimes,
watching them, I see a study in
learned helplessness -- they've let themselves be
beaten down so many times they just want to cringe in the corner
and give up. Other times, I see the
Stockholm syndrome -- they want to lick the hands of
the people who are punching them. Or maybe they do indeed know
exactly what they're doing -- their "inability" to cope with those
obstreperous Republicans is great for fundraising. Regardless,
listening to them whine about how they can't pass legislation
because they don't have 60 votes is like listening to a guy who
says he can't work because he's wearing handcuffs -- handcuffs he's
put on himself, and to which he's holding the key.
Ironically, undergirding the cynicism and cowardice is stupidity. I
doubt the average voter knows that much about the details of health
care reform or any other proposed legislation or platform. Most
people don't choose a product because they really know the
product's features; instead, they make an emotional decision
based on the product's brand. At this point, the
Republican brand is "bully." Not good, you might think, because
most people hate bullies. But the Democratic brand is "coward." And
looking out at a scary, uncertain world, a lot of people would
rather be led by a bully than by a coward. Until the Democrats
grasp this obvious, fundamental point, their fortunes will continue
to come down to the results of single special elections, their
turns in the White House to interludes between bouts of Republican
incompetence so profound that desperate voters will temporarily
grasp at any alternative. You can call this state of affairs a lot
of things, but "prescription for getting things done" will never be
one of them.
Between one party that's
"corrupt and inept," and the other that's "batshit
insane," what can be done? Digby has the best and most
level-headed plan I've come across. Read it on
Hullabaloo here.
P.S. Yesterday
Scott Horton blew gigantic holes in the government's
attempt to cover up torture and murder at Guantanamo. Overseas
papers are all over the story, but the
American mainstream media won't touch it. Make a
difference -- post, tweet, or forward Scott's article and do what
you can to make America a nation under the rule of law.
Date Published: Jan 19, 2010 - 1:28 pm
President Obama's
Nobel acceptance speech has been praised by a
number of
people I
admire. I wish I could agree with them. In fact,
even apart from the "War is Peace" elements inherent in a man
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize immediately after escalating one of
the three wars he is waging, I thought the speech was insidious and
appalling.
The speech is fulsome in its praise of the law, and in its call
that nations that break the law be punished. "Those who claim to
respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws
are flouted," for example. So far, so good. But then Obama says
this:
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest
in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we
confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe
the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the
conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom
we fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I
prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the prison at
Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed
America's commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose
ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to
defend. (Applause.) And we honor -- we honor those ideals by
upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is hard.
This paragraph is pleasant on the surface, and poisonous
underneath. Obama has no more power to prohibit torture than Bush
had to permit it.
Torture is illegal in America. The law, not the
president, is what prohibits torture. What would you make of it if
the president said, "That is why I prohibited murder. That is why I
prohibited rape. That is why I prohibited embezzlement, and mail
fraud, and tax evasion." And the point applies equally to Obama's
order to close Guantanamo (which, in any event, is nothing more
than
classic Obama sleight of hand) and his
reaffirmation of the Geneva Conventions.
In America, the president doesn't make the law, nor does he rescind
it. The president executes the law -- which is why Article 2 of the
Constitution is called "
The
Executive Branch." Presidents who make and rescind laws at will
are more commonly known as kings.
While we're on the subject of the Constitution, that increasingly
quaint document, former Harvard Constitutional Law Professor Obama
also said this: "But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend
my nation...". There is no such oath in the Constitution. Rather,
Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that the
president will take the following oath: "I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
See if you can spot the difference between the oath Obama now says
he took and the one he actually took. President Bush and Vice
President Cheney
didn't know the difference, either. That, or one or
more of these men knows better, but finds distorting the nature of
his oath politically expedient.
I suppose Obama felt there was no way around his speech's
non-sequitur theme of "We must uphold the law, so I prohibited
torture." Because he refuses to prosecute torture (the insane
bromide "we have to look forward, not backward" is the real Obama
Doctrine), he can't acknowledge torture is a crime. If it's not a
crime, it must be just a policy difference. And, indeed, the
implication of Obama's benevolent prohibition on torture and
refusal to prosecute it is that a less enlightened future president
might re-implement the "policy" of torture as easily as Obama
rescinded it.
It's good to be the king.
Date Published: Dec 17, 2009 - 9:21 am
Foreword:
I wrote the following piece over four years ago for
Confessions of an
Idiosyncratic Mind and the
Philadelphia City Paper. On the eve of President
Obama's announcement of a
major escalation in Afghanistan, it's sadly timely.
I hope there won't be cause to reprint it four years hence.
Remember when Blockbuster Video charged three dollars for a
two-night video rental, and one dollar per night if you were late?
They made most of their profits from late charges. Why? Because if
you didn't get a chance to watch the movie during the first two
nights and returned it at that point, you had to pay three dollars
for nothing. If you kept it just one more night and watched it,
you'd pay four dollars for something -- not as good as what you
were originally planning, but a much better deal than the three
dollars for nothing you were facing instead. Except... something
came up on that third night, too. Now you're four dollars in the
hole and still nothing to show for it. But if you hold on for just
one more night, you can get what you originally hoped for five
dollars, rather than nothing for four. Strong incentive to hang in
for just one more night and turn the whole thing around.
By the tenth night, you were kicking yourself for having rented the
damn thing in the first place. Even if you watched it tonight, you
paid much more than it was worth, and you knew it. But there was
nothing you could do to get that ten dollars back. If you could
just watch the movie, at least you'd have
something to show for the whole sorry
enterprise.
But you didn't watch it that night. And maybe after two weeks, when
you were down fifteen bucks in exchange for no value, you finally
decided you were never going to watch it, it wasn't worth even a
dollar more, it was time to cut your losses and just return the
movie. And you did. You had nothing to show for the exercise, but
at least you stopped the bleeding.
The example is trivial, I know. But dynamics at work for small
things tend to apply to big ones, too.
Here's what I said over four years ago.
*******************************************
I've been thinking about what happens when a society goes to war
for a limited objective but then comes to face what seems to be an
unlimited cost.
The more blood and treasure a society spends on such a war, the
harder it becomes to acknowledge that it can't be won. After
spending so much, a retreat would be painful: The society would
have to acknowledge that the entire enterprise — the lives lost,
the money spent — was a waste (worse than a waste, really, because
of opportunity costs and unintended consequences).
Any society would want to avoid the pain inherent in such
acknowledgment. It would prefer to believe there is still some
chance of winning. If victory is possible, even if securing it
turns out to be costlier than first believed, at least the society
would have something to show for what it paid.
If you were a member of the administration that launched such a
war, and you understood these dynamics, what would you do? Even if
you knew, up front or deep down, that the war couldn't be won,
would you bring the troops home?
Not likely. You would have to take the entire blame for the
failure, with no room for face-saving or rationalization. Most
people wouldn't be able to face such an unarguable personal
failure. Instead, consciously or unconsciously, such an
administration would seek to defer the withdrawal to a successor.
Doing so would obscure the administration's personal and historical
culpability for the war: Members would always be able to say, "We
could have won if our successors hadn't lost their nerve." And who
could "prove" them wrong?
I expect such an administration would continue the war, trying to
keep U.S. casualties close to levels the public had already proven
willing to accept. Periodically, the administration would announce
"turning points," the achievement of which would imply that the
nation is indeed on the road to victory. As each previously
declared turning point is reached and revealed to have no effect on
the course of the war, the administration would articulate a new
one, thereby maintaining the public's hope that there is still some
purpose to the enterprise — that the war can still be won.
Simultaneously, the sunk costs of the war would be increasing,
deepening the society's need to win, somehow, if only to justify
the increasing costs.
This is a potent political combination: undiminishing casualty
levels, constant infusion of new hope, increasing sunk costs.
Because this combination is relatively stable while the pain of a
"we can't win" acknowledgment gets worse the longer the war drags
on, the status quo would prevail for a long time. Eventually, the
war could be passed on to the next administration. Blame for losing
it could be passed on as well, or at least shared and obscured.
At some point, during the tenure of the administration that
launched the war or of one of its successors, the war will have
dragged on long enough to force the conclusion that victory isn't
possible. It's not so much that the pain of what has been spent
becomes overwhelming; it's the sense of nothing but further pain
ahead, for no possible gain, that would bring about a new consensus
on the war. Vietnam illustrates the point. I don't think what
happened was, "We've lost 58,000 Americans and that's enough." It
was more like, "We've lost 58,000, and even with another 58,000 I
still don't see how we can win this." In other words, the pain of
acknowledging failure was finally outweighed by the prospect of
more pain for no gain. When a society reaches this point, it
abandons the war.
In trying to articulate these dynamics, I've deliberately avoided
mention of current events. Sometimes you can see more clearly by
taking a step back from the matter at hand. But obviously I do
think what I've described above applies to the Bush administration
and Iraq. Maybe the question isn't just, "Is the war winnable?" but
rather, "Even if it's not winnable, what will the administration
and our society do then?" It's that second question that's
important to answer.
Date Published: Dec 01, 2009 - 10:12 pm
This morning, while reading The Washington Independent's Daphne
Eviatar's excellent report on
the death penalty for terrorists, two things
occurred to me.
First, there's been much wailing and gnashing of teeth on the right
about trying Khalid Sheik Mohamed in New York City because,
apparently, KSM said he wanted to be tried in New York. As Rudy
Giuliani said, "I didn't think we were in the business of granting
the requests of terrorists."
Giuliani's point is of course silly -- as Dahlia Lithwick put it,
"Funny, that. I didn't think we were in the business of
caring one way or another
what the terrorists want from us" -- but let's assume for the
moment that Giuliani really wants to follow the principle he
articulated. If we shouldn't grant terrorist requests, what would
Giuliani have us do with terrorists who want to be put to death,
who believe that being executed by infidels will make them martyrs?
Would Giuliani argue that because a convicted terrorist asked for
the death penalty, we shouldn't execute him? Hard to imagine. So
what principle is really behind Giuliani's remarks? And if there is
no principle, what's motivating him instead?
Second, a common complaint on the right is that we mustn't try
terror suspects in America because doing so would make us unsafe
(similarly, we can't imprison terrorists even in supermax prisons
from which no one has ever escaped because... well, it's not clear
why, exactly, but incarcerating terrorists in quality American
prisons scares some people a lot). For example, John "Surrender is
Not an Option" Bolton says
he's practically ready to evacuate his family from New
York if we try KSM there, because such a trial will render New
York unsafe.
Let's do for Bolton what we've done for Giuliani -- extract the
principle he's articulating, and see whether he's serious about
applying it. The principle is: we should deviate from applying our
rules of justice if we're afraid that following those rules could
increase the danger of a terror attack. Well, what if it's possible
executing terrorists would do just that? It's hard to imagine John
Bolton or anyone like him arguing we shouldn't execute terrorists
because doing so might lead to new terror attacks. But then what
principle is really driving him? Or what's driving him in the
absence of principle?
There was some spirited debate in the comments to my
previous post over my use of the term
"rightist." I'll have more to say on the topic of nomenclature in a
future post, but for now: if you're talking about rhetoric and
policy positions fueled by fear (or the cynical exploitation of
fear), rhetoric and positions so unprincipled they crumble in the
face of even the most cursory logical scrutiny (like that applied
above) you're almost certainly talking about the right -- meaning
the Republican party. I don't know why someone would dispute this.
You can either embrace it ("Hell, yes, I'm afraid, and you should
be too, and with good reason"); or you can disassociate yourself
from it ("I'm not a Republican"). What you can't do is say, "Well,
that's just George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, John McCain, Sarah Palin,
Michele Bachman, Rush Limbaugh, Michael Steele, Glenn Beck,
Hannity, Michelle Malkin, Ann Coulter, Rudy Giuliani, John Bolton,
Bill Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Andy McCarthy, Rich Lowry, et
al. They're not really representative of the GOP."
One of the things I always find telling is when a person or
institution stands for something, but won't acknowledge standing
for it. If you advocate torture, say so! Why go all mealy-mouthed
and hide behind euphemisms like "alternate interrogation
techniques?" Similarly, if you're afraid and think the country
should be afraid, too, why not say so? The GOP, by its rhetoric and
policy positions, is indisputably the party of fear. And what's
wrong with that, if we really ought to be afraid? It's the "Be
afraid" rhetoric and positions, coupled with the refusal to own up
to it, that makes me suspicious.
More on nomenclature, right and left, next time. Happy
Thanksgiving.
Date Published: Nov 26, 2009 - 11:46 am
War is Good
I don't mean to
pick on The Economist (and I doubt they'd care
if I did). I love the magazine. But the oddities are piling up.
The current issue is dedicated to
"Dealing With America's Fiscal Hole." In the
leader of that name, and in
"Stemming the Tide," the three-page briefing that
follows it, the magazine proposes a number of ways America might
reduce spending and reduce its current
$12 trillion
national debt. Yet among all its proposals, which include
innovative and politically risky schemes like a carbon tax and a
national value added tax, and which include a call to cut social
security and health care spending, not a passing thought is given
to war. Not a single word on the subject in the leader, and only a
few lines in the briefing -- lines devoted to
dismissing the notion of reducing
military spending.
When military spending is so sacrosanct it doesn't even get
mentioned as reducible in the service of America's economic health
(if for no other reason), something seems amiss. Especially when
one considers that our wars since 2001 have thus far cost somewhere
in the neighborhood of
$935 billion (eventual costs of the Iraq war alone
are reckoned to be in the
$3 trillion range).
The kindest explanation I can come up with is that The Economist,
like
others in the media, puts a high priority on
war. I wonder, though, why they don't explicitly say so?
One of those Essential Rightist
Moments
Here's Bill O'Reilly, declaring,
"I
don't care about the Constitution."
In fairness to O'Reilly, I imagine he'd explain his remark by
saying he was just trying to get his guest to offer his personal
views on the matter of terror trials in civilian courts: "The
Constitution isn't here," as he put it. "You're here." But why
would O'Reilly care about what someone thinks irrespective of what
the Constitution provides? His follow-on is telling: "Don't be a
pinhead." Translation: "Don't be one of them, one of the out-group.
Show me you have the right loyalties, that your loyalties are
tribal, and that those loyalties trump your adherence to an
objective application of the rule of law."
I like this clip because it captures something essential to the
rightist mentality. It's not that rightists don't care about the
Constitution (despite O'Reilly's claim); it's more that they don't
get the Constitution. They
don't get that you can't apply the law through a tribal filter,
with one set of rules for your group and another set of rules, or
no rules at all, for the "pinheads," or "enemy combatants," or
"terrorists," or whatever other designation the tribalist employs
to avoid having to apply the law impartially.
Another Essential Rightist
Moment
Another incident I like for the way it illuminates rightist
thinking (or what passes for rightist thinking) is Obama's recent
bow to Japanese Emperor Akihito. Obama's bow precipitated
predictable outrage on the right, with cries of "
treason," "
weakness," etc.
It's as though these people don't know that in Japan, the bow is a
sign of respect. Or maybe they know it, but believe the purpose of
diplomacy is to show other countries we're so badass we can ignore
their customs? That we can disrespect other countries and still get
what we want? What do these people think diplomacy is for? Do they
have any capacity at all to look at things from the other side? Or
are they so insecure that they can only imagine a show of respect
being taken instead as a sign of weakness?
Rhetorical questions, I know. Generally speaking, there are two
kinds of temperament in America today: one that's so weak and
fearful it declares a bow off limits even in the land of bows; the
other confident enough to understand adopting your neighbor's
custom will be taken as a sign of respect. One, delusional enough
to believe you can get what you want in life through disrespect;
the other, competent enough to understand that respect in human
relations is essential. One, so brittle it's afraid -- literally --
to bend; the other, sufficiently supple to recognize that diplomacy
without flexibility is just a metaphor for pigheadedness -- and
futility.
Obama's bow was also useful because of the way it exposed rightist
hypocrisy. Did anyone who criticized Obama for bowing to the
Japanese Emperor criticize
Bush for holding hands and kissing the Saudi
King? If not, the kindest explanation for the discrepancy is
that there's something more verboten in America about a man bowing
to another man than there is about a man holding hands with and
kissing another man. That would be a tough argument to support,
given rightist homophobia, but even if I bought it, we'd be back to
the explanation above: rightists are relatively brittle, fearful,
and insecure.
Despite its shortcomings, though, the right does have a talent for
communication (usually fear-based). True, Democratic marketing
geniuses decided to apply the shockingly banal label "public
option" to their health care reform proposals, thereby ensuring
they would have the world's most boring rallying cry with which to
respond to GOP "death panel" accusations. But still, think about
it: the right managed to convince significant segments of the
voting public that government subsidized health care would be bad
for them -- and that trillions spent instead in Iraq and
Afghanistan would be good! Even with marketeers as feckless as the
Democrats for opponents, convincing people to turn away a
government subsidy and send the money to foreigners instead is no
easy task. I wish the right would do it for sugar beet farmers,
bankers, and mortgage holders, too.
Date Published: Nov 23, 2009 - 4:36 pm
I've been reading The Economist for decades and have always admired
the magazine for its coverage, insights, and eclectic politics (who
else in the media has called for Bill Clinton's resignation, gay
marriage, war in Iraq, and drug decriminalization?). I've respected
the magazine's opinions even when I disagreed with its conclusions.
But lately, I find myself wondering about its common sense. Two
pieces from the October 17 issue,
Obama's War and
To Surge or Not to Surge, both calling for
escalation in Afghanistan, are useful to study not just to expose
the flaws in escalation theory specifically, but to illuminate
various species of weak critical thinking in general. Let's take
the magazine's arguments for escalation one by one.
1. "A less intensive, more surgical
'counter-terrorism,' relying on unmanned air raids and
assassination... is more likely to kill civilians and create new
enemies than to decapitate and disable al-Qaeda."
Certainly killing civilians and creating new enemies would be
counterproductive for any policy. It's reasonable, therefore, to
ask whether sending tens of thousands of additional foreign troops
into the country eight years into the war might have a similar
effect, or even a worse one. Yet The Economist doesn't consider the
costs of its favored policy. It's as though those costs don't
exist.
The general flaw here is the assessment of costs only of one course
of action, not of its proposed alternative. If your house and
belongings were being ruined by a leaky roof and someone told you
repairs would cost a thousand dollars, would you reflexively say,
"Forget it, too costly?" Or would you also consider the costs of
ongoing water damage caused by an unrepaired roof, and measure one
against the other?
2. "Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a
Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border
instability."
The specific problem here is that the argument ignores not just
theoretical alternatives, but also actual history. If cross-border
stability is a goal, it's important to ask whether there was more
of it before or after the current war began. If the answer is
"before," we can reasonably infer that the presence of foreign
troops in the country is part of the cause of the current
instability, and that more troops would make things worse.
The more general problem here is unexamined assumptions.
Afghanistan has a whole history of instability. Why ignore that
history when asserting withdrawal would worsen things? Why leave a
critical assumption untested when you have so much data to test it
with?
Note too the related assumption: stability in Afghanistan is so
vital a western interest that no one even has to explain what the
interest is. Stability is one of those words that just gets
intoned, thought-free, by serious-sounding people who rarely bother
to explain why the stability is important enough to warrant a war
to maintain it -- and who even more rarely pause to consider how
war might foster stability's opposite.
3. "Defeat for the West in
Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but
all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks."
The argument is that we shouldn't do something to embolden our
opponents, yes? Then why does The Economist not also discuss the
way war -- particularly escalation --
emboldens our opponents? Or can only withdrawal
embolden opponents, while escalation can't?
Again, it seems the only costs are those associated with the course
of action The Economist seeks to dismiss. The magazine's preferred
alternative is free of such costs, and apparently of other costs,
as well. Wouldn't it be nice if life were really like this?
4. "Withdrawal would amount to a
terrible betrayal of the Afghan people, some of whose troubles are
the result of Western intervention."
I don't know how you measure something like this, especially after
the kind of rigged election Karzai just pulled off. Regardless,
will this always be true? Afghanistan seems historically a hard
place to pacify. How long does The Economist propose staying to
avoid betraying the Afghan people? How many lives is it willing to
spend for this avoidance? How much money? It doesn't say.
Starting to see a pattern here? If a salesman were trying to sell
you a car this one-sidedly -- "no costs, unless you
don't buy the car!" -- would you get
out your checkbook?
5. "The Afghan conflict, it is
often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year
wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so the most important
reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much
better."
If you knew someone who had been married and divorced eight times,
would you recommend he give it another go because he can do better?
If, as you lay down on the operating table, you learned that your
surgeon had killed her previous eight patients, would you take this
as a sign your operation will be a success?
They say past performance isn't an indication of future results.
Maybe not. But the notion that eight years of failure means ipso
facto next year will be better is contradicted by history, everyday
experience, and common sense. As an argument, it is, simply,
delusional.
6. "The coalition’s leaders, at
least, seem to have grasped that it must behave not as an occupying
army but as a partner, whose aim is to build up the local forces
that will ultimately ensure Afghanistan’s security. And soldiers
and civilians are beginning to understand that development aid can
benefit local people rather than foreign consultants and
contractors."
If it took eight years for our leaders to figure these things out,
is that cause for encouragement? Or despair? If you knew someone
who'd been driving for eight years and only just figured out the
importance of using the turn signal and rear view mirror and
putting on the headlights at night, would you then confidently hand
him the keys to your vehicle? Or would you instead sense that
someone who learns this slowly will never manage to safely drive a
car?
7. "The coalition, however, lacks
three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a
credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do
the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this
war."
I think Rory Stewart said it best:
"This is
not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got."
8. "As for resources, it is worth
remembering that in 2006, before the American surge, prospects in
Iraq looked far bleaker than they do now in
Afghanistan."
It's odd to tout Iraq as the kind of success we might emulate in
Afghanistan.
Andrew Bacevich:
Six-plus years after it began, Operation Iraqi Freedom has
consumed something like a trillion dollars—with the meter still
running—and has taken the lives of more than forty-three hundred
American soldiers. Meanwhile, in Baghdad and other major Iraqi
cities, car bombs continue to detonate at regular intervals,
killing and maiming dozens. Anyone inclined to put Iraq in the
nation’s rearview mirror is simply deluded. Not long ago General
Raymond Odierno, Petraeus’s successor and the fifth U.S.
commander in Baghdad, expressed the view that the insurgency in
Iraq is likely to drag on for an-other five, ten, or fifteen
years. Events may well show that Odierno is an optimist.
Given the embarrassing yet indisputable fact that this was an
utterly needless war—no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found,
no ties between Saddam Hussein and the jihadists established, no
democratic transformation of the Islamic world set in motion, no
road to peace in Jerusalem discovered in downtown Baghdad—to
describe Iraq as a success, and as a model for application
elsewhere, is nothing short of obscene. The great unacknowledged
lesson of Iraq is the one that the writer Norman Mailer
identified decades ago: “Fighting a war to fix something works
about as good as going to a whorehouse to get rid of a clap.”
For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at
nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix,
say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our
southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other
commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks
Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude.
9. "Mr Obama... might well reflect
on a line from a British counter-insurgency specialist, quoted in
Lewis Sorley’s book 'A Better War,' which White House staff are
said to be busily reading. South Vietnam, he says, could have been
saved if America had not cut off military aid to its government.
'Perhaps the major lesson of the Vietnam war,' said Sir Robert
Thompson, 'is: do not rely on the United States as an
ally.'
Perhaps so. Perhaps the point would be more relevant if Sir
Thompson and The Economist could point to the country whom South
Vietnam could have relied on instead. Otherwise, you could as well
argue that Bill is useless to have your back in a fight because he
lacks mutant invisibility powers and titanium-coated skin.
10. "Most of all, Mr Obama needs to
fight this war with conviction. His wobbles over the last month
have done more to comfort his enemies and worry his allies than any
recent losses on the ground. Only if he persuades his troops, his
countrymen and the Taliban that America is there for the long haul
does he have a chance of turning this war around."
This sounded familiar to me. So I looked up
William Westmoreland on Wikipedia and found this in
his 1967 address to a joint session of Congress:
In evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he
believes our Achilles heel is our resolve ... Your continued
strong support is vital to the success of our mission ... Backed
at home by resolve, confidence, patience, determination and
continued support, we will prevail in Vietnam over the Communist
aggressor!
Indeed, the oddest thing about reading The Economist's articles
this week was my sense that, had the word Vietnam been substituted
for the word Afghanistan, they could have been written anytime
during that earlier war (and I'm sure they were). Well, those who
don't learn the lessons of history and all that.
Measure the costs of all proposed courses of action, not just one.
Identify and test your assumptions. Recognize that multiple
failures and extraordinarily slow learning are not cause for
optimism for success. Don't confuse a description of what you lack
with a strategy for achieving it. Spot and learn from historical
parallels. Common sense, you would think. But not, apparently, when
such common sense is most urgent.
P.S. On the subject of weak critical thinking, conservative NYT
columnist
Ross Douthat claims the secular arguments
against gay marriage can be summed up as "institutional support for
reproduction."
Reproduction needs institutional support? I actually can't think of
something that needs
less
institutional support. Breathing, maybe. And the guy calling for
this institutional support for reproduction also calls himself a
conservative, presumably in favor of small government and all that?
Bonus points, Ross, for irony.
Date Published: Oct 23, 2009 - 2:33 pm
Hi everyone, forgive my long hiatus. If anyone here is considering
moving back from Tokyo, living in a house while it's being
renovated, and finishing a manuscript all at the same time, I would
advise... don't. But the worst of the storm is past, thank God, and
it's good to be back at blogging. Lots to catch up on; here are
three recent items that strike me as all being evidence (along
with, say,
the bizarre and unconstitutional reverence for "our"
Commander-in-Chief) of the creeping militarization of American
society.
1. On Fox News Sunday,
Liz Cheney offered these thoughts on Obama's
Nobel:
Well, I think what the committee believes is they'd like to live
in a world in which America is not dominant. And I think if you
look at the language of the citation, you can see that they talk
about, you know, President Obama ruling in a way that makes sense
to the majority of the people of the world. You know, Americans
don't elect a president to do that. We elect a president to
defend our national interests. And so I think that, you know,
they may believe that President Obama also doesn't agree with
American dominance, and they may have been trying to affirm that
belief with the prize. I think, unfortunately, they may be right,
and I think it's a concern.
Here are the main premises in the paragraph above:
A. America should dominate the world.
B. The president "rules" America.
C. Americans elect a president exclusively, or at least primarily,
to "defend" our national interests.
D. The defense of America's national interests should not, and
indeed cannot, make sense to the majority of the people of the
world.
Let's examine the premises Cheney regards as axiomatic.
A. Is it necessary, desirable, or even possible for America to
dominate the world? What are America's national interests, and is
world dominance necessary for their defense? Do all countries
require world dominance to defend their national interests, or is
America unique in this regard?
B. Does the president "rule" America? (Hint: the president's job
description is helpfully laid out right in
the
Constitution. Very handy document.)
C. Is it true that Americans exclusively or primarily elect a
president to "defend" our national interests? What else do we want
a president to do? What does it suggest when someone mentions
"defense" as the only, or even the primary, role Americans expect
in a president (as opposed to, say, advancing interests, or
continuing
to form a more perfect union... that kind of thing)?
Especially when the same person suggests the president "rules"
America?
D. Is it true that when the president defends America's national
interests, his actions cannot and should not make sense to the
majority of the world? Is
a decent respect for the opinions of mankind
incommensurate with the defense of our national interests, or a
part of that defense?
2. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)
supports a repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
which is good. But the senator also says, "It has to be done in the
right way, which is to get a buy-in from the (U.S.) military (that)
I think is now possible."
Huge majorities of Americans, including majorities of Americans
with family members in the military,
favor a repeal of DADT (it seems the military itself
seems
about evenly divided). Regardless: what,
specifically, would the required military "buy-in" consist of? Was
the military's "buy-in" also required when
President Truman ordered desegregation? Are
there other issues for which the civilian government and civilian
population require the military's "buy-in?" Are there other
institutions from which the President and Congress require buy-in,
or is it just the military? What does Levin's notion suggest about
current notions regarding military subordination to civilian
leadership?
3. In a
September 11 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Fouad
Adjami, who writes like Peggy Noonan (this is not a compliment),
claimed, "Wars are great clarifiers." Adjami was so certain of the
truth of his statement that he didn't even bother to support it,
and instead offered it up as an axiom.
Is it true wars really are great at clarifying things? Or do they
tend instead to enflame and obscure? What does it say about a
person's worldview when he believes it virtually goes without
saying that wars greatly clarify things?
Against the creeping authoritarianism that today thoroughly infests
the GOP but that shows increasing virulence outside it, as well,
awareness, outspokenness, and familiarity with the Constitution are
the best defense.
P.S. Glenn Greenwald has a
terrific related interview with Jonathan Weiler,
co-author of "Authoritarianism & Polarization in American
Politics."
Date Published: Oct 12, 2009 - 3:40 pm
I just read this article in today's New York Times:
"Sotomayer Says Identify Won't Distort Her
Positions."
"Judge Sonia Sotomayor insisted on Tuesday, in the face of
sometimes skeptical questioning from Republicans, that she would
never allow her background or life experiences to determine the
outcome of a case if she were elevated to the Supreme Court."
Two questions and an observation:
1. Has a white man ever been asked if he would allow his background
to determine the outcome of a case?
2. Is it even conceivable that a white man would be asked if he
would allow his background to determine the outcome of a case?
3. Worse: a white man
has
claimed that his background affected and would continue to affect
his decisions. That man was Justice Sam Alito, who
said during his confirmation hearings:
"But when I look at those cases, I have to say to myself, and I
do say to myself, 'You know, this could be your grandfather, this
could be your grandmother. They were not citizens at one time,
and they were people who came to this country...'
"When I get a case about discrimination, I have to think about
people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of
their ethnic background or because of religion or because of
gender. And I do take that into account."
(Hat Tip
Glenn Greenwald)
Imagine those words coming out of Sonia Sotomayer's mouth. Imagine
the Republican furor.
So when a white man says his background will affect his decision
making as a Justic, that's an asset for Republicans. A Latina, on
the other hand, is forced to disclaim such a possibility.
Wow.
Date Published: Jul 14, 2009 - 2:02 pm
This post began as a response to a series of comments on my
FaceBook page, where I posted a video of
Rachel
Maddow interviewing Rep. Patrick Murphy, an 82nd Airborne Iraq
war veteran, winner of the Bronze Star, and Congress's point man
for the repeal of the military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)
policy. You can find the full text of those comments
here, and a similar exchange with a woman who
conflated gays and child molesters,
here.
After writing my response to the anti-gay commenters, I realized
what I'd written would serve well as its own post. Here it is.
You know why these discussions can be so sterile? Because the
people who talk the most and listen the least are the ones with the
most nonsensical, ill-considered opinions. I guess this makes
sense, in a way. After all, if you know deep down that your opinion
will be exposed as nothing but ignorant, empty prejudice in the
face of evidence, logic, argument, and even common sense, your best
strategy will be to ignore such things any time you encounter them
in favor of throwing up an unending stream of thoughtless
bullshit.
So, Brentt and Colin, you ignored my request to substitute the word
"blacks" for the word "gays." Here, let me do it for you in your
own comments:
"It all comes down to following orders. If you can't abide by
having to serve in an all-black unit and not being able to serve
with whites, then you deserve whatever comes your way, and it makes
me happy to see it... Just because you're black doesn't mean you
get special treatment so grow up, man up and follow the rules...
All I am saying is that in order to maintain professionalism in an
all volunteer military, you volunteer once, and then do what you're
told to do after that. It doesn't mean you have to like it, you
just have to do it... Just because they are black they are exempt
from the rules? I think not."
"I think all the blacks should be put into their own regiment. That
would give them a way to show their true merit and defend or avenge
their black buddies in battle."
How does that read to you? It's exactly what you're arguing.
Brentt, your thoughts on the discriminatory nature of DADT also
ignore previous comments -- again, presumably because you're not
reading them. As others here have said, and as even the most
elementary common sense ought to suggest to you, DADT is indeed
discriminatory because it
only
applies to gays. The only way you could miss a point so
obvious is if you're motivated by something other than reason.
Here, let me clarify by substituting the word "straight" for the
word "gay" in your comment:
"If any of you try to make this a debate about discrimination,
you'd be wrong. The military is not saying that you can't be
straight and serve in the military. They are only saying that you
can't ask anyone if they are, or tell anyone that you are. It's
perfectly fine for you to be straight and serve in the military and
has been for 15 years or so when President Clinton enacted this
policy."
Do you see it now? A law that allows one class of people to
acknowledge their sexuality and punishes another class of people
for acknowledging their sexuality is inherently, obviously,
discriminatory. If you want DADT to apply across the board -- such
that anyone who acknowledges his or sexuality, straight or gay,
will be discharged -- then it won't be discriminatory. Otherwise,
by definition, it is.
Really, to miss a double standard so blindingly obvious, you'd have
to start with the premise, conscious or unconscious, that gays are
in some way illegitimate. Which I guess is where you're coming from
and is unlikely something you can be reasoned away from if you're
sufficiently motivated to adhere to your view.
"So, the question here is this: Is the Military ready for
homosexuals to openly serve?"
But I already specifically addressed this exact question in one of
my comments above, in which I referenced Truman's desegregation
order, the Civil Rights Act, and the attitudes of the military and
society at large. I argued, in fact, that this is
not "the question," nor should it be,
nor was it or should it have been then. Now you're raising the
question again as though for the first time, suggesting that for
you, it *is* the first time, because the most charitable
explanation I can devise for why you would ask the same question
that has been responded to previously without even noting the
existence of that previous response is that you're not reading the
comments to which you purport to be responding. And because you
haven't responded to a single one of the arguments Rep. Murphy lays
out in the video interview I linked to, and because many of his
points contradict your own, I imagine you haven't watched the
interview, either.
Discussing -- if that's the right word -- an interview you haven't
even bothered to listen to is odd behavior. I wonder what would
motivate it.
Your conflation of sexual assault with homosexuality is borderline
insane and regardless, has already been addressed in other comments
here. Sexual assault and other forms of assault are and should be
illegal, in the military and elsewhere. Assault has nothing to do
with homosexuality or heterosexuality, and the fact that you would
argue otherwise again suggests that your views are motivated by
something other than reason.
As for your conflation of sexual orientation with marital affairs,
this is as worthy an argument as your conflation of sexual
orientation and sexual assault. Once again, if you can't understand
the difference between orientation and behavior -- about the same
as the difference between being left-handed, on the one hand, and a
left hook, on the other -- something is going on inside you, and it
isn't reason.
Your suggestion that most gays are just malingerers who are using
their gayness as an excuse to get out of the military is similarly
revealing. The only evidence you cite is that you have "seen many
people" do so -- as though someone as prejudiced as you could be
counted on to adequately account for someone's motivations -- and
you ignore the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Rep. Murphy
points out that over 13,000 military personnel -- over three combat
brigades worth -- have been discharged for being gay. And you
assume that a significant percentage of that number were
malingerers? Based on a few people you claim to know? Without
offering any other evidence for your opinion? Tendentious would be
a charitable way of describing your views.
If you really believed your "they're all malingerers" theory, and
you really wanted to stop the malingering you assume is so
widespread, you would support ending DADT. But you don't -- leading
me, once again, to wonder what's really motivating you.
Your fear that straights might freak out if they knew there was a
gay in a communal shower is also strange. First, there already are
gays in the showers, and good order and discipline seems to go on.
Is your point that good order and discipline can be maintained if
straights know there are gays in the shower, but not if straights
know who some of these gays are? I guess you're arguing then, as
Col. Jessup might say, that straights "can't handle the truth."
Well, what was your previous advice for gays? "Man up and follow
the rules." I could be wrong, but I have a feeling most soldiers
devoted enough to serve and brave enough for combat can handle
knowing some of their comrades, equally devoted and brave, are gay.
But don't take my word for it: watch the Rep. Murphy video you're
pretending to discuss and see what he has to say on the matter.
**********
I promised in a previous post to do an article on how to argue. I
haven't forgotten and in fact have outlined some of the points I
want to make. But the new book, a sequel to
Fault
Line called
Inside Out, is due at the end of the month, and
I've still got a ways to go, so I'm trying to keep my blogging
semi-under control.
Pending the article on how to argue, I'll just say this: if you
want your argument to be persuasive, and if you hope to be taken at
all seriously, at a minimum you have to: (i) familiarize yourself
with what's being discussed, whether it's an interview, an article,
or the comments of other posters; (ii) respond to points that other
people are making, ideally by quoting their exact words; and (iii)
understand the difference between opinion and evidence and use the
latter to bolster the former.
Final point: for anyone who wants to hear from me a little more
frequently, I've been posting updates on
Twitter. I
confess when I first heard of a 140-character-per-post social
networking medium, I thought it sounded silly. It's actually
interesting, useful, and productive, though it can be a hell of a
distraction, too. Anyway, if you're on Twitter, follow me, and I'll
look forward to seeing you there.
Date Published: Jul 11, 2009 - 5:03 pm